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Abstract 
Do institutions spatially affect growth? By employing a neoclassical growth model with institutional 
controls and augmenting the model with a formal spatial framework, this study finds evidence that 
institutions has spatial spillover effect on economic growth based on a panel observation from 58 
developing countries for the period between1985-2008. This study also shows that the spatial lag model is 
the most appropriate to model the spillover effect. 
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1. Introduction 
In the institutional literature, studies to formally incorporate institutional quality in spatial econometric  
modelling to account for  its spatial dependence are  undoubtedly of a recent vintage, see for example 
Kelejian et al. (2008), Faber and Gerritse (2009), Bosker and Garretsen (2009), Claeys and Manca (2010) 
and Arbia et al. (2010). These studies examine spatial spillover effect of institutional quality and uncover 
the channels of the institutional spatial spillover effect. Earlier, there are a number of empirical studies 
whose findings support the existence of institutional spatial dependence between neighbouring countries, 
such as Ades and Chua (1997), Easterly and Levine (1998), Murdoch and Sandler (2002) and Simmons 
and Elkins (2004); these studies however do not employ a formal spatial econometric framework. In this 
study, we employ a formal spatial econometric namely spatial lag model to investigate the spatial 
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dependence between growth and institutions. A standard neoclassical growth model augmented with 
institutional controls is estimated and spatial lag model is found to be the most appropriate model to 
account for the spatial dependence. This indicates that the spatial externalities are not a nuisance factor, 
but a substantive one. Institutions are proxied by two indices reflecting property rights and political 
institutions and they are shown to significantly determine economic growth in developing countries and 
the institutional spillover is found to exist between the countries via an indirect route, i.e. institutions in a 
country lead to economic improvement in that country and subsequently give impact to the neighbouring 
countries’ income growth. This study is organized as follows: section 2 explains the model and data 
sources, while in section 3 estimations results are discussed. Section 4 concludes. 
2. Model and data sources 
Consider a simple growth model as the following: 
 
  Xygt 0log  (1) 
 
where tt yg log which is a vector of real GDP percapita growth rates,   is a vector of constant terms, 
0log y  
is a vector of logs of real GDP per-capita at the beginning of the period, X  is a matrix of 
explanatory variables,  is the convergence coefficient, is a vector of parameters, and ),0(~ 2IN  is a 
vector of i.i.d. error terms. A set of explanatory variables X is added as steady state determinants and 
following Mankiw et al. (1992) stock of physical (sk) and human (sh) capitals, as well as a term (n+g+δ) 
that accounts for the sum of population growth, growth in exogenous technological process, and 
depreciation rate, respectively are included (henceforth called MRW variables). To capture the absolute 
location effect of institutions, the model is augmented with indices of institutional quality namely the 
security of property right index (iiqicrg) and the political institutions index (iiqpol). In full, the matrix of 
K explanatory variables is therefore given by X=[sk, sh, n+g+δ, iiqicrg, iiqpol] where each element is an 
Nx1 vector. 
The spatial dependence in the growth model of Equation (1) is tested via two ways, firstly via spatial 
autoregressive error term, which means the error term of Equation (1) is now composed by: 
 
uW    (2) 
 
where W is a spatial weight matrix incorporating the spatial connections of the system, λ is a spatial 
autoregressive parameter, ε is a vector of spatially correlated errors, and u is a vector of a spatial 
disturbance term with i.i.d. properties. Equation (2) assumes that the spatial externalities are a nuisance 
factor since they propagate to neighbouring countries via the “error term”. Secondly, a spatially lagged 
dependent variable is included in Equation (1) to model a more direct or more substantive effect of the 
spatial relationship: 
 
uWgXyg   0log  (3) 
 
and ρ is the spatial autoregressive parameter capturing the effect of spatially lagged dependent 
variable, u is a vector of a spatial disturbance term with i.i.d. properties. The spatial weight matrix, W, 
becomes the linkage among the countries in the sample, and in this study it is specified as inverse squared 
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distance†  whose elements are defined according to a gravity function that provides an exponential 
distance decay. In other words, all features influence all other features but the farther away something is 
the smaller the impact it has. The advantage of using geographical-based distance is that it is 
unambiguously exogenous to the model, and therefore it eliminates the problem of identification, causal 
reversion, and non-linearity.  
A panel observation for 58 developing countries in Africa, East Asia, and Latin America for a period 
beginning 1984 to 2007 is used in this study. Data on real GDP per capita and population growth are 
obtained from World Development Indicators (WDI) from the World Bank (2009)‡. Investment share of 
real per capita GDP is used as a proxy for capital and the investment data is obtained from Penn World 
Table 6.3 (Heston et al. 2009). Secondary school attainment for population age 15 and above from Barro 
and Lee (2010) educational data§ is used to proxy for human capital. Four institutional indicators based on 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) obtained from the PRS Group (2009) i.e. Investment Profile, 
Law and Order, Bureaucracy Quality, and Government Stability are used to measure institutional quality 
index that reflect security of property rights, whereas four indicators i.e. Polity2 from Polity IV data 
(Marshall and Jaggers, 2008), Political rights from Freedom in the World index which is also known as 
Gastil index (Gastil, 1978), Polcon3 from The Political Constraint Index (POLCON) Dataset (Henisz, 
2010) and Checks from Database of Political Institutions by the World Bank (Beck et al., 2001) are used 
to proxy the political institutions index. The index computed as simple average of the four indicators from 
ICRG is called iiqicrg and it reflects security of property right, while the average of four political 
indicators from four different sources become the second index called iiqpol reflecting the political 
institutions. 
3. Estimation results and discussion 
Based on the Equation (1) and (3), four different specifications are employed, all with real GDP 
percapita growth (g) as the dependent variable, and log of initial income (log y1984) as variable to test for 
the convergence effect. Model (1) is a baseline model with only MRW variables i.e. physical (sk) and 
human capitals (sh) and a sum of population growth, exogenous technological process and depreciation 
rate (n+g+δ). Model (2) and (3) introduce institutional controls using iiqicrg and iiqpol indices, 
respectively, and finally in Model (4) which is the general model both institutional indices enter the 
equation simultaneously.  
Presented in Table 1 below, the results of OLS regression of Equation (1) fit the stylized facts of 
growth analysis since the conditional convergence hypothesis is fully supported in the developing 
countries under study with consistently negative significant coefficients for initial income across all 
estimations. Coefficients of the other growth determinants are also statistically significant with the 
expected sign except population growth which is positive. It is however not surprising to have positive 
population growth effect on economic growth especially in developing countries as shown by Headey and 
Hodge (2009) who found no strong support for the opposite hypothesis.  
Meanwhile, the institutions growth-effect seems to originate from the property rights index, iiqicrg. Its 
coefficient in model specification (2), where only the index is used in the estimation, is significantly 
different from zero at 1% level. In model (3), when political institutions index, iiqpol, replaces iiqicrg, it 
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is also significant at 1% level. When both variables enter model (4) regression, however, only iiqicrg 
remains highly significant at 1% but iiqpol is now only marginally significant at 10% level. This result 
indicates the importance of property rights institutions towards economic growth, and its greater 
significance (in term of larger magnitude and higher significant level) in model (4) regression when both 
property rights and political institutions appear in the estimation have somehow attenuated the impact of 
political institutions previously found to be highly significant in model (3) regression. 
  
Table 1: OLS regression of growth model with institutional controls  
 
Model specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 log y1984 -0.008*** (0.0015) -0.009*** (0.0015) -0.009*** (0.0015) -0.009*** (0.0016) 
 sk 0.029***(0.0026) 0.025***(0.0026) 0.028*** (0.0026) 0.024*** (0.0027) 
 n+g+δ 0.012***(0.0016) 0.011***(0.0016) 0.012*** (0.0016) 0.011*** (0.0016) 
 sh 0.001*** (0.000) 0.001*** (0.000) 0.001*** (0.001) 0.001*** (0.000) 
 iiqicrg - 0.008*** (0.001) - 0.009*** (0.001) 
 iiqpol - - 0.002*** (0.001) 0.001* (0.001) 
constant -0.115*** (0.017) -0.126*** (0.017) -0.118*** (0.017) -0.136*** 
Adjusted R
2
 0.136 0.176 0.140 0.170 
Note: Dependent variable is real GDP percapita growth. Model specification (1) is baseline model with only MRW variables 
i.e. sh, sk, and n+g+δ, model (2) with MRW variables and iiqicrg, (3) with MRW variables and iiqpol, and (4) with MRW 
variables, and both iiqicrg and iiqpol indices. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denotes significance at 1%, 
5% and 10% respectively. 
 
The presence of spatial autocorrelation in the residuals of OLS regression is tested using Moran’s I 
test. The results in Table 2 indicate that the Moran’s I null hypothesis of no global spatial autocorrelation 
in the residuals of OLS regression is overwhelmingly rejected. This finding holds across difference model 
specifications hence it can be safely inferred that Equation (1) is misspecified and the OLS estimates are 
invalid. Once the spatial autocorrelation is detected, robust Lagrange Multiplier (LM) tests developed by 
Anselin et al. (1996) is used to decide between the spatial error model or spatial lag model. From the 
robust LM test statistics reported in Table 2, spatial error model is apparently inappropriate to explain the 
data as it fails in a number of cases (specifically in model (2) and (4)) compared to spatial lag model, 
hence the latter model is preferred. 
 
Table 2: Moran’s I and Robust LM tests statistics  
 
Model specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Moran’s I test statistics 5.185*** 4.884*** 4.901*** 4.744*** 
Spatial error: Robust LM test  40.286*** 1.768 34.930*** 2.53 
Spatial lag: Robust LM test 67.543*** 12.168*** 59.907*** 14.229*** 
Note: Dependent variable is real GDP percapita growth. Please refer Table 1 note for information about Model (1) until (4).  
Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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The results from maximum likelihood estimation of the spatial lag growth model are presented in 
Table 3 and they have somehow mirrored the previous findings in OLS estimation, particularly the effect 
of institutional quality on growth. The parameter of interest in this regression is the coefficients of the 
spatially lagged dependent variable,  ,  and they are positive significant across all model specifications at 
1% level and Wald test for null hypothesis of 0
 
are overwhelmingly rejected in all occasions. This 
finding gives an empirical support to the proposition of positive spatial autocorrelation in per-capita 
income growth of the developing countries. As positive effect of institutional quality towards per-capita 
income growth is already reported earlier, this further confirms that institutional spatial dependence 
between the countries runs via indirect route, where institutions in a country lead to economic 
improvement in that country and generate spillover effect to neighbouring countries’ income growth. This 
finding is apparently similar to Easterly and Levine (1998), Ades and Chua (1997), Murdoch and Sandler 
(2002), Bosker and Garretsen (2009) and Arbia et al. (2010) who find evidence of positive spillover 
effect of growth in neighbouring countries to home countries’ growth. 
 
Table 3: Spatial lag maximum likelihood regression of growth model using inverse squared distance weight matrix 
 
Model specification (1) (2) (3) (4) 
log y1984 -0.007*** (0.001) -0.001*** (0.001) -0.008***(0.001) -0.009***(0.001) 
sk 0.026*** (0.003) 0.022*** (0.003) 0.025***(0.003) 0.022***(0.003) 
n+g+δ 0.012** (0.005) 0.012** (0.005) 0.013**(0.005) 0.012**(0.005) 
sh 0.001*** (0.00) 0.001*** (0.000) 0.001***(0.000) 0.001***(0.001) 
iiqicrg - 0.008*** (0.001) - 0.008***(0.001) 
iiqpol - - 0.002** (0.001) 0.001* (0.001) 
constant -0.119** (0.048) -0.129*** (0.047) -0.122** (0.048) -0.131*** (0.047) 
ρ 0.336*** (0.060) 0.277*** (0.060) 0.325*** (0.060) 0.269*** (0.061) 
Squared Correlation 0.154 0.184 0.158 0.186 
Variance Ratio 0.126 0.178 0.132 0.181 
Log likelihood 2147.774 2174.965 2150.104 2176.432 
Wald test 31.172*** 21.004*** 29.046*** 19.693*** 
No of observations 1392 1392 1392 1392 
Note: Dependent variable is real GDP percapita growth. Please refer Table 1 note for information about Model (1) until (4). 
Standard errors are in parentheses. Wald test is for null hypothesis that ρ=0 ~χ2(1). ***, ** and * denotes significance at 1%, 
5% and 10% respectively. 
4. Concluding remarks 
On overall, this study finds an empirical support for institutions-growth spatial dependence in the 
developing countries under study. Specifically, it shows that institutions exert positive significant 
spillover effect towards economic growth and the effect is found to run via indirect route i.e. institutions 
in a country lead to improvement in economic growth in that country and this situation consequently 
generates spillover effect on economic growth in neighbouring countries. This finding is similar to that of 
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Easterly and Levine (1998); Ades and Chua (1997); Murdoch and Sandler (2002); Bosker and Garretsen 
(2009); and Arbia et al. (2010). 
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